We show that the rule that allows the inference of A from A B is admissible in many of the basic multiplicative (intensional) systems. By adding this rule to these systems we get, therefore, conservative extensions in which the tensor behaves as classical conjunction. Among the systems obtained in this way the one derived from RMI m (= multiplicative linear logic together with contraction and its converse) has a particular interest. We show that this system has a simple in nite-valued semantics, relative to which it is strongly complete, and a nice cut-free Gentzen-type formulation which employs hypersequents (= nite sequences of ordinary sequents). Moreover: classical logic has a simple, strong translation into this logic. This translation uses de nable connectives and preserves the consequence relation of classical logic (not just the set of theorems). Similar results, but with a 3-valued semantics, obtain if instead of RMI m we use RM m (the purely multiplicative fragment of RM).
Introduction
The purely multiplicative fragment 1 of substructural logics in general, and relevance logics in particular, is universally considered to be the best behaved and best understood fragment, especially from a proof-theoretical point of view (it is called \the multiplicative paradise" in Gi87]). Relevantists have never considered it as su cient, though, since its expressive power (so everybody believes) is rather limited. A crucial connective which it seems to lack is conjunction. Sure, it does have the tensor (\fusion" in relevantists' terminology), which has many intuitive properties of conjunction. But neither A nor B follow from A B in the standard substructural logics, contradicting a most fundamental intuition about conjunction. According to this intuition the three classical (or intuitionistic) natural deduction rules should be valid for any \conjunction" operator.
The relevantists solution to this problem is to enrich the multiplicative language with a new connective, &, which is intended to represent conjunction. There is a big obstacle for this, though: one cannot add to the standard relevance logics the implications A&B ! A, A&B ! B and A ! (B ! A&B). Such an addition is not conservative even in the case of LL m . In the case of R m (the multiplicative fragment of R) the result is simply classical logic. To overcome this di culty the axiom A ! (B ! A&B) is replaced by the adjunction rule: from A and B infer A&B. Alas, by doing this the relevantists destroy the principle according to which their multiplicative logics are constructed: that B should follow from the assumptions A 1 ; : : :; A n i A 1 ! (A 2 ! ! (A n ! B) ) is a valid formula. 2 Moreover: the addition of the so-called extensional connectives leads to systems which are much more complicated (from a proof theoretical point of view) than their purely multiplicative fragments, and even with this addition we do not really get classical conjunction. We do have, of course, a translation of classical logic which is the simplest possible: the classical negation, conjunction and disjunction are interpreted by primitive connectives of the logics. Nevertheless, this interpretation is just a weak interpretation: it does not preserve the consequence relation. Thus MP for the translation of classical implication is not valid. It is only admissible in R (and the related systems) by a famous theorem of Meyer and Dunn ( MD69] . See also Du86]). 3 It is worth noting that even this partial success is achieved at the cost of losing decidability and of having no decent proof theory. 4 In this paper we investigate a di erent approach. We shall try to take seriously as conjunction. The idea is simple. Instead of adding to the multiplicative language a new connective and force it to be a conjunction by a special rule, we shall remain within this language and force to be a conjunction by a special rule. The rule we use is just the inference of A from A B.
A rst thing that needs to be checked is whether by adding this rule we get completely new logics with new sets of valid formulae. The problem in di erent terminology is whether the new rule is admissible in the various multiplicative relevance logics or not. In section 3 we show that at least in one important extension of R m it is indeed admissible: in RMI m (the system which is obtained from R m when we add to it the mingle axiom). Moreover, the rule is admissible also in all possible extensions of RMI m in its language, including RM m (and also in LL m , by the way).
In the rest of the paper, we concentrate, therefore, on RMI m and its extensions. Our main conclusion is that by adding the new rule to them we do change into conjunction, but without losing any relevant feature of the original systems. Moreover: this approach has the following advantages over the more usual one:
1. Unlike R, SRMI m (= RMI m + A B A ) has a simple, useful semantics in the form of the in nite-valued matrix A ! of Av84]. SRMI m is strongly complete relative to this matrix (while RMI m itself is only weakly complete relative to it). This is shown in section 4.
2. Unlike R, SRMI m is decidable (this follows from (1), since A ! can be used for a decision procedure).
3. There is a strong translation, preserving also the consequence relation, of positive classical logic into SRMI m . Moreover, if we add an appropriate propositional constant ?
to SRMI m we get a conservative extension, SRMI ? m , which has all the nice properties of SRMI m and into which full classical logic can strongly be translated (SRMI ? m is investigated in section 5, while the translations of classical logic are described in section 7). m ) has a cut-free Gentzen-type formulation with the subformula property. This formulation employs hypersequents (= nite sets of ordinary sequents). Its rules for all the connectives (including !) are exactly the same as in all other substructural logics. Just like in Dosen's principle ( Do93] ), it di ers from the formulations of other substructural logics only with respect to structural rules. This shows that is still the usual multiplicative tensor of all other substructural logics.
The Gentzen-type systems are treated in section 8. Although there seems to be no real need in SRMI m for the additives, one can introduce in SRMI m a purely relevant version of them. This possibility is described in section 6. This section includes also a short discussion of quanti ers (to be expanded in the future). An interesting possibility here is to introduce multiplicative versions of the quanti ers instead (or along with) the additives ones of the other substructural logics.
Preliminaries
This section summarizes material concerning substructural logics which by now is almost common knowledge. See AB75], Du86], Gi87], Av88].
Syntactical Matters
De nition 1. The basic multiplicative language this is the propositional language which has a unary connective and two binary connectives: !; . Notes. is admissible in all the systems above (in fact, cuts can systematically be eliminated, so this is equivalent to a cut elimination theorem). 
Semantical Matters
No simple sound and complete semantics for LL m and R m is known at the time this paper is written. 9 The situation with respect to the other 3 systems is di erent, though:
De nition 4 Av84]. The fact that RMI m and RM m are only weakly complete relative to their characteristic matrix raises two interesting questions. The rst is to nd a broader semantics for them, relative to which a strong soundness and completeness theorem obtain. A solution to this problem is described in Av92a] (see there for full references 10 ). The second problem is to nd proof-theoretical characterizations of A! and A 1 which are strongly complete. This problem is solved below. Before reaching the solution we turn, however, to another interesting problem which is strongly related to proposition 11.
With the obvious exception of classical logic, none of the multiplicative logics reviewed above was accepted as a \complete" logic. 11 The main reason, as we note in the introduction, is that they lack an appropriate conjunction connective (which is usually taken as the simplest connective of classical and intuitionistic logics!). Of course, it can be debated what exactly is meant by \an appropriate conjunction". Nevertheless, there is a certain basic intuition concerning it which is best re ected in the standard natural deduction rules for conjunction:
De nition 5. Let L be a logic with a consequence relation`L. A connective^of L is a standard conjunction if the following 3 rules are valid:
Proposition 12. With the exception of classical logic, none of the systems discussed in I.1 has a de nable standard conjunction.
Proof: It su ces to show that there is no formula '(p; q) (containing only p and q as atomic variables) such that:
Assume otherwise. Then the deduction theorem for RM m (prop. 2), (i) and (ii) imply:
The same theorem and (iii) imply that either`R Mm p ! (q ! '(p; q)) or`R Mm q ! '(p; q) or`R Mm p ! '(p; q) or`R Mm '(p; q). The last three possibilities together with (i') and (ii') contradict the fact that`R Mm `C Lm . In the rst case (i') implies that RMm p ! (q ! p), but this formula is not valid in A 1 (take v(p) = I 1 ; v(q) = >).
The solution in the literature on linear and relevance logics to the above problem is invariably to enrich the purely multiplicative language by a new connective & for which the conditions in de nition 5 are assumed. 12 Hence in RMI ( Av90b] ) a relevant conjunction is added, for which C!A C!B C!A&B is valid but not (in general) adjunction.
This approach of enriching the language has a very serious drawback. The resulting systems are all notoriously much more complicated than their multiplicative fragments from a proof-theoretical as well as a semantic or a computational point of view. 13 There are also di culties concerning the consequence relations associated with these logics and the associated deduction theorems (see Av92a]). All these problems do not exist in classical logic, of course. There, however, we do not have to enrich the language, since the multiplicative fragment is strong enough. In particular: the multiplicative serves in classical logic as a standard conjunction. Now in all the systems above has a lot of properties which we expect conjunction to have. Thus condition (iii) of de nition 5 obtains, and even in the form of a valid implication:
A ! (B ! A B). The equivalence in all of the systems between A B ! C and A ! (B ! C) is another extremely important property of usual conjunction connectives.
In addition is associative and commutative in all the systems. In RMI m (and RM m ) it is even idempotent, while in R { semi-idempotent (idempotency properties of are the main di erence between LL m , R m and RMI m according to the Hilbert-type representations in I.1!). It is no wonder, therefore, that is usually taken as a sort of conjunction. Still, it is di cult to accept it as such as long as A and B do not follow from A B.
The idea we are about to pursue is that instead of adding a new connective and explicitly demand the validity of adjunction for it { we can turn into a standard conjunction by explicitly demanding the validity of A B A and A B B .
De nition 6. Let L be any of the Hilbert-type systems described in I.1. Then SL (\strong L") is the system which is obtained from L by adding A B A as a new rule.
Note. Since 4 The Strong Semantics of A ! SLL m seems to be an interesting system, strongly related to LL m . Unfortunately, I am not aware of an interesting, complete semantics for it. Of course, any semantics for SLL m is also a semantics for LL m , and it is already at this stage that no nice semantics is known. For RMI m and RM m we do have the semantics of A ! and A 1 , relative to which they are weakly complete. Our next goal is to show that SRMI m and SRM m are strongly complete relative to these structures.
Our task is easy when we limit ourselves to nite theories.
Theorem 15. A 1 ; : : : ; A n A! B i A 1 ; : : : ; A n`SRMIm B.
Proof: The soundness part is almost immediate from proposition 6. One needs only to check the validity of the extra rule A B
A in A ! . This is easy.
For the converse we need rst a lemma. Note. We We turn now to prove the strong completeness theorem in its full generality. In view of theorem 15, this is equivalent to the compactness theorem for A! . We have found it easier, however, to prove completeness directly, and from this to derive compactness.
Theorem 17. 15 (strong soundness and completeness theorem for SRMI m ). T A! ' i T`S RMIm '. Proof: The soundness part is the same as in theorem 15.
For completeness, assume T 6 ' (we shall write just \`" instead of \`S RMIm " until the end of this proof). We construct a valuation v which shows that T 6 A! '. For 
Adding Propositional Constants
We shall see below that the basic multiplicative language of SRMI m su ces for a strong translation of classical positive logic, but not of classical negation. The semantics of A ! provides, however, a very obvious interpretation of absurdity (and \truth"). The corresponding propositional constants obey the laws of Girard's additive constants (but we shall argue below that at least in the present context, if not in general, they really belong to the multiplicative fragment).
In the next de nition and later we use the notations which are employed in Tr92] for the propositional constants, rather than those used in Gi87] 17 .
De nition 8. Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of theorem 17. What about adding to the basic multiplicative language analogues of Girard's multiplicative constants 0 and 1? 19 Well, it is shown in Av84] that one cannot conservatively add such constants even to RMI m : the purely multiplicative fragment of the resulting system is RMI 1 m = RM m . This shows that those \multiplicative" constants are in fact in direct con ict with the basic multiplicative connectives (at least in the framework of RMI m and its extensions, except for RM m and CL m ). One can add them conservatively, though, to RM m . The interpretation of both 1 and 0 in such an extension is I.
We turn now to discuss the nature of the language of SRMI ? m . In particular: is it still a \multiplicative" language? Or better: does the addition of ? to the basic multiplicative language signi cantly change its character so it cannot be taken as \multiplicative" any longer?
To answer these questions we should nd out rst what does the term \multiplicative" actually mean, and what is so special about it. For convenience we shall mainly concentrate in what follows on constants which represent the two types of \truth": > and 1. The other two propositional constants which are used in the various substructural logics are de ned from them using negation. > is characterized by the axiom A ! > (in Hilbert-type formulations) or ? ) ; > (in Gentzen-type formulations). 1 is characterized by the axioms 1 and 1 ! (A ! A) (Hilbert) or by the axiom ) 1 and the rule ?) 1;?) (Gentzen). In Gi87] 1 is \multiplicative" and > { \additive", but one can nd there no de nition of these terms, 20 so this fact alone does not answer our questions (at least not the second one). Girard's distinction between multiplicatives and additives was predated by the relevantists' distinction between intensional connectives and extensional connectives. The idea of this distinction is that the (classical) truth-value of a sentence which is constructed from some components using an extensional connective depends only on the truth-values of the components { and nothing else. (For example: & is extensional since A&B is true i both A and B are true). An intensional connective is simply one which is not extensional (for example !, but also ! or ). This distinction does not really distinguish between > and 1: both should be taken according to it as \extensional" (=additive?)
A much clearer distinction can be made within a Gentzen-type framework. Here the distinction primarily applies, however, to rules and the way they treat their non-active formulae. A multiplicative rule is a context-free rule: the \non-active" formulae of the premises are transferred into the conclusion, and there should be no connection between the nonactive formulas of the various premises or any side condition on them. 21 A good example is provided by the cut rule. Here the only \active" formula is the cut formula, and the multiplicative form of this rule is: It is plausible to de ne a system to be multiplicative in case all its rules are multiplicative. The main virtue of a multiplicative system is that if a certain sequent follows in it from a nite set of other sequents, then we can add to each side of any of the assumptions any multiset of formulae we like, and all these multisets will be transferred to the (corresponding side of the) conclusion. This seems to me to be the characteristic feature of the various multiplicative logics mentioned above, and what makes them so convenient to deal with. Now, the addition of the various propositional constants to these systems preserves this crucial property (while the addition of the standard binary additive connectives does not). For me this is a su cient justi cation for the claim that we are still dealing with a multiplicative system when we add the so-called additive propositional constants. As for the question what is a multiplicative connective: I prefer to leave it open.
Here are some other facts that show that at least at the context of RMI m it is more appropriate to take >, rather than 1, as multiplicative: 6 Adding Additives and Quanti ers
Adding Additives
It is at rst sight unclear whether there is really a point in trying to add analogues of the \additive" connectives to SRMI m . In relevance logic the motivation for introducing the socalled \extensional connectives" is to have analogues of the classical, purely truth-functional conjunction and disjunction. In SRMI m is a proper substitution of classical conjunction, and we shall see below that we have a faithful translation also of classical disjunction. On the other hand, the additives are computationally important in Linear Logic ( Gi87], Ab93], Al94]). Now this paper does not deal with computational aspects of the logics we investigate, but the Gentzen-type systems of section 8 strongly suggest that such exist. The additives might be useful when these aspects are worked out. Moreover: while the language of SRMI m contains an obvious relevant disjunction, it does not have a relevant conjunction (such that A^B can be true only if A and B are mutually \relevant"). Somewhat paradoxically, an appropriate version of the additive conjunction turns out to be an excellent candidate. The standard way of adding additive conjunction^in substructural logics is to add the axioms: As was noted already in the previous section, these axioms and rules cannot be added conservatively to RMI m (and so to SRMI m ). Such an addition leads to RM m (to which these axioms and rules can conservatively be added, of course). Instead, a relevant conjunction was conservatively added to RMI m in Av90a, b] . The di erence is that the adjunction rule is We next turn to the semantics of SRMI and SRM. The main observation here is that A ! becomes a lattice if we de ne a b , a ! b 6 = ? (the order is simply ? I n > for all n). The axioms for^and _ obviously mean (as always) that they should correspond to the operations of lub and glb in this lattice. De ning valuations on A ! accordingly, it is a straightforward matter to extend the soundness and strong completeness results to SRMI and its extensions (including SRM). 23 In the usual relevance logics like R, but not in linear logic, also the distribution axiom of^over _ is added. This is certainly not a necessary property of the additives. 24 In order to get a cut-elimination theorem it is necessary also to use the mingle rule rather than the expansion rule. The resulting system is called RMI min in Av90a, b] . The full system RMI is obtained by adding also a weak form of distribution in the Hilbert-type formulation, or using hypersequents (see below) in the Gentzen-type version. 
Adding Quanti ers
This subsection is only sketchy (a full treatment will be given elsewhere). Its main purpose is to indicate how, in principle, quanti ers can be introduced in the present framework.
The standard method of introducing quanti ers in substructural logics is to use for them exactly the same rules as in classical logic. This makes 8 a sort of in nite additive conjunction and 9 { a sort of in nite additive disjunction. In the case of SRMI we should, like in the case of^and _, add the condition that the multiset of side formulae should not be empty in () 8) and (9 )). The rules for 8, e.g., will therefore be: 
(where y is not free in C in the rules).
The obvious semantics of 8, e.g., is that v(8xA(x)) = sup d2D fA(d=x)g where D is the domain of discourse (we use here the fact that A ! is a complete lattice). One should note that the generalization rule (from A infer 8xA) is not valid in A ! (but it is valid in A 1 ).
The substitution rule (from A infer A(t=x)), on the other hand, is valid, and should be adopted as an o cial rule in both the Hilbert-type and Gentzen-type formulations (it is admissible in both, but not derivable). Alternatively, one can forbid valuations in which v(p(a 1 ; : : : ; a n )) = I i , v(p(b 1 ; : : :; b n )) = I j and i 6 = j (where p is atomic). With this limitation on the semantics the generalization rule becomes valid.
It was observed in Do93] that only additive versions of the quanti ers can be found in existing systems of substructural logics, and that a multiplicative universal quanti er would presumably be something like an in nite tensor. In SRMI it is, in fact, particularly natural to apply this idea. A multiplicative universal quanti er can semantically be de ned by the conditions: It follows that in order to get a translation of full classical logic, we should enrich the basic multiplicative language. Now an easy (and quite common) method of getting full classical logic from its positive fragment is to add a propositional constant ? together with the axiom ? A, and then de ne :A = A ? (::A A is then provable using Pierce law). Luckily, the semantics of A ! provides, as we have seen, a very obvious interpretation for such a propositional constant. 25 This result was also stated without a proof in Av92a]. 8 A Gentzen-Type System Our goal in this section is to present a Gentzen-type system for the A! relation (in the languages without the additive connectives). This might seem strange, since we already have a cut-free system, GRMI m (GRMI A n ) is also involved) . Another motivation is the following: the characterization using GRMI m implicitly relies on the rule A B
A . In order to show beyond any reasonable doubt that we are dealing with purely multiplicative systems, we want to have a system which di ers from those of the other multiplicative systems only in its structural rules (which should all be \multiplicative" by the characterization given in section 5).
Our main tool in achieving this goal is the use of hypersequents. 27
De nition 9. A Hypersequent is a syntactic structure of the form ? 1 ) 1 j? 2 )
Internal Structural Rules Note. The proof of the last proposition is semantic. Indeed, it is not clear how to translate directly proofs which use hypersequents to those which do not. Thus in example 1 above all the components of all the hypersequents are single-conclusioned, and so all the internal structural rules which are used in it are left-hand-side rules. It is not di cult to see, however, that every proof in GRMI m must use contraction and its converse on the right-hand side. In the proof we present below the only internal structural rules which are used are right-hand-side rules. It is unclear, therefore, what the connection can be.
Example 2. infer ? ) ; 'j ) ' from ? 1 ) 1 ; ' by strong splitting (note that a cut-free proof of a sequent in GRMI m is also a proof without cuts and external contractions of the same sequent in G A! ). Otherwise we have by induction hypothesis an appropriate proof of a sequent of the form ? 1 ) 1 ; 'j ) 'j j ) ' . By applying strong splitting to this hypersequent we get a proof of the type we seek of ? ) ; 'j ) 'j j ) ' The last theorem entails that we don't need cuts for demonstrating that ? A! A. Does the system G A! as a whole admit cut-elimination? The answer is positive, although the proof is much more complicated.
Theorem 40. G A! admits cut-elimination.
Proof: As usual (see Av87]), the main problem is posed here by the rule of external contraction. To overcome this problem, we need the \history" technique of Av87]. Since details are similar to those in Av87] (and rather complicated), we omit them.
It is possible to give a completeness theorem for G A! which applies to arbitrary hypersequents. First { a de nition.
De nition 12. Let T be a set of formulas, H { a hypersequent. We say that T`G A! H i there exist sets i ; ? i ; i (i = 1; : : : ; n) such that 1 ; ? 1 ) 1 j j n ; ? n ) n is provable in G A! , and for all 1 i n, i T and ? i ) i is a component of H. Theorem 41. T`G A! H i every model of T in A ! is also a model of H.
Proof: The only if part is a straightforward generalization of the soundness theorem.
For the converse, assume T 6 G A! H. We construct a model of T which is not a model of H. For this extend T to a maximal theory T such that T 6 G A! H. Obviously 
